with the Enlightenment, the humanism of extropianism places at its center certain unique qualities of the human-self-awareness, consciousness and reflection, self-direction and development, the capacity for scientific and technological progress, and the valuation of rational thought. As Max More's "The Extropian Principles: A Transhumanist Declaration" (1999) cites, key principles include "perpetual progress," "self-transformation," "practical optimism," "intelligent technology," "open society," "self-direction," and "rational thinking."
Like the Enlightenment's view of science and technology, extropians also take technological development as inevitable progress for the human. The technologies of robotics, nanotech, cryonics, and neural nets all offer modes of enhancing, augmenting, and improving the human condition. As the "Transhumanist Declaration" states:
Like humanists, transhumanists favor reason, progress, and values centered on our well being rather than on external religious authority. Transhumanists take humanism further by challenging human limits by means of science and technology combined with critical and creative thinking. We challenge the inevitability of aging and death, and we seek continuing enhancements to our intellectual abilities, our physical capacities, and our emotional development. We see humanity as a transitory stage in the evolutionary development of intelligence. We advocate using science to accelerate our move from human to a transhuman or posthuman condition. (More 1999, paragraph 3) A key element in the extropian approach toward technology is that technological progress will necessarily mean a progress in "the human" as a species and as a society; that is, just as the human will be transformed through these technologies, it will also maintain, assumedly, something essential of itself. It is in this tension between identity and radical change, between visions of software minds and the realities of biological bodies, that extropianism reveals the inner tensions of posthumanist thinking. As a particular thread in the discourse of the posthuman, extropianism can be characterized along three main lines: as a technologically biased revision of European humanism, as an approach to technology as both self and not-self, and as a tendency to apply life science concepts toward social and political problematics. A further elaboration of these trends follows.
Humanism
The self-referential move of extropianism as an "upgraded" humanism is strategic; it enables posthumanism generally to replay the centrality of human forces in shaping the world through science and technology without any passive reliance on Luddite ideologies, "nature," or religious authority. Seen as a form of humanism, the posthuman puts leading-edge technologies in the hands of human subjects as agents of change. Historically, this moves beyond the control over the natural environment encapsulated by Western industrialism; it moves toward a wholesale transformation not only of the environment but of the human controllers of that environment. The blind spot of this thread of posthumanism is that the ways in which technologies are themselves actively involved in shaping the world are not considered. To borrow a term from Bruno Latour, extropianism privileges the technologically enabled subject as the agent of change, without due consideration to the ways in which "nonhumans" and "actants" are also actively involved in the transformation of the world (Latour 1999, 122-23 ). This is not to suggest that we somehow invest our technologies with human subjectivity, but that the situated, contingent effects of technologies are indissociable from the subjects that "use" those technologies. While the humanist slant of extropian thinking clearly privileges a futuristic vision serving the human (postbiological life in hardware systems, intelligence-augmented minds, and, closer to the present, extended life span, genetically modified health, and smart drugs), what remains unclear for the extropians is the extent to which the human can be transformed and still remain "human." Extropianism escapes this problem by claiming a universality to certain attributes, such as reason, intelligence, self-realization, egalitarianism, ethical thinking, and transcendence. By assuming that "intelligence" and "sentience" will remain constants over time and through successive transformations, extropianism smuggles humanistbased conceit into a technologically driven evolutionary paradigm. The conflicts arise when posthuman thinkers must consider the fate of the human or its history. What often goes unconsidered are the ways in which the human has always been posthuman and the ways in which technology has always operated as a nonhuman actant (Ansell-Pearson 1997, 123-50; Latour 1999, 174-216).
Tech Tools
One of the crucial requirements for the posthuman is that technology be approached first and foremost as a tool. This technology-as-tool motif-an investment in enabling technology-operates in several ways. In one sense it presupposes and requires a boundary management between human and machine, biology and technology, nature and culture. In this way extropianism necessitates an ontological separation between human and machine. It needs this segregation in order to guarantee the agency of human subjects in determining their own future and in using new technologies to attain that future. It is asymmetrical, in which the human subject is the actor and the technology is the prosthetic that the human subject uses (Hayles 1999, 2-3). This separation also provides the assurance of the neutrality of technology. As Marshall McLuhan long ago argued, the most dangerous position vis-a-vis technology is to assume its neutrality (McLuhan 1995, 11-12) . In this way, the safe, secure space of pure research can provide for a range of utopian possibilities without regard to the historical, social, and political contingencies that enframe each technological development. Thus the human-or rather a humanist standpoint-becomes the safeguard against the threat of technological determinism. It is the human user that guarantees the right, beneficial use of otherwise value-neutral technologies. Lastly, the ontological separation of human and machine is also the establishment of a certain distance between the natural and technical domains, and this distance provides a source of security for the ongoing development of the human as a product of evolution. By taking technology as transparent, extropianism can suggest that it will change, benefit, and improve the human in a manner totally amenable to the norms of all institutional, governmental, and technological contexts.
Thus technology operates in a complex way for the extropian branch of posthumanism. It is taken as a tool, one that is both transparent and value-neutral, and thus abstracted from any sociohistorical contingencies. But this ontological separation also hides a fantasy of technology embedded in the posthuman generally: a fantasy about the anachronism of technology, in which the human advances so far that it doesn't need technology, that technology in effect disappears. The goal here is to attain a state of optimum self-sufficiency, autonomy, and self-realization such that the management of the human/ machine divide is, in fact, no longer necessary. While in one sense this would seem tantamount to saying that the human becomes technology, the rhetoric of extropianism is-like that of most technophilic movements-about the world in the service of the human (be it the natural world, as in biotech, or the artificial world, as in AI).
SF Politics
A common political strategy in extropian texts when dealing with social concerns is to apply concepts from science and technology toward the political domain. The most common such trope used is that of biological evolution, in which the co-evolution of humans and machines will lead to a postevolutionary phase in which the abstract "emergence" of intelligent computers will dominate (that is, the democratization of biology-as-politics, from linear, hierarchical trees to planar, brainy complexity) (Kurzweil 1999, 40-51, 101-33).
The Extropy Institute's emphasis on "open society" and "selfrealization" (among other terms) illustrates this tendency to conflate the stratifications between the discourse of science and political discourse. This is indicated by the common absence of the issues of race and ethnicity, gender and sexuality, public policy, governmentality, warfare, and global economics in most extropian texts. Similarly, Kurzweil applies evolutionary thinking to technological development, arguing that human societies are currently undergoing a kind of exponential evolution-what he terms "the law of accelerating returns" (1999, 29-30). In the domain of the life sciences, such formulations are analogous to Richard Dawkins's sociobiological theories of "memes," or the DNA of culture-units that replicate, hybridize, and spread throughout a cultural context (such as concepts, fashion, songs, and so on) (Dawkins 1976,189-202) .
The bottom line for extropian thinking is the human subject as a biological animal, the individual or population as a species. Yet the vision of a posthuman future is predicated on the (technical) capacity to surpass this "merely" material foundation. From this biopolitical stance, scientific and technological concepts are completely transparent, and it is from these models (such as molecular genetics and evolution) that the capacities, constraints, and mobilities of human beings in social and political contexts are measured. What warrants a critique of extropianism's particular use of scientific concepts as political platforms is that, quite simply, they don't hold water. Any critical interrogation of the relationships between scientific and political discourses needs to pay attention to the contingencies involved in producing scientific concepts and artifacts, while not simply denouncing scientific discourse as pure construction. In the best-case scenario, scientific concepts can transform politics, just as such applications will reveal the limitations of the ideologies embedded in scientific concepts.
OTHER POSTHUMANISMS
One of the most resonant aspects of Donna Haraway's 1985 "Cyborg Manifesto" was that its appropriation of the terminology of the cyborg was itself a performative gesture against the necessity of origin stories (Haraway 1991, 180-81) . By strategically borrowing the figure of the cyborg from space-race-era NASA research into enabling astronauts to survive in "alien" or extraterrestrial environments, Haraway shows how the doubled contingency of humans and technologies will always require critical gestures, ironic gestures, even ludic gestures, which will turn upside down, and render impure and noninnocent, our views of the human condition.
This move is also a key element to the more critical threads of First, we might take Shannon's model for communication to distinguish several elements involved in the processing of information. Shannon depicts information not as an object but as a resultant measurement from processes, and each of these processes is a differential between some two values. Information thus passes through a sender, is encoded into a particular technological format appropriate for communication (e.g., telephone, telegraph, the Internet), is transmitted via a given technological medium (electrical wire, fiber optic cable), is decoded as it arrives at its destination, and then goes to the receiver (Shannon and Weaver 1965, 31-35). Using this model, we can distinguish three elements at work: a "message" or content, information, and the medium. This distinction is important to note because Shannon's model shows us that we are not simply dealing with a form/ content dichotomy. The quantity "information" is situated between the meaning or content it codes for and the medium that supports it. The distinction is also important because neither Shannon nor Wiener make much mention of the medium or the hardware involved in the information transmission process. Just as the quantity "information" is assumed to unproblematically signify the message, so is the medium assumed to unproblematically mediate information. As will be suggested later, this downplaying of the medium, and this assumption of information technology as transparent, will significantly affect the ways in which subjects and bodies are or are not mediated through newer fields such as biotechnology.
Second, this emphasis on information as a quantitative unit does not mean that there is an object called "information" that is qualitatively different from the message. Ironically, the rhetorical emphasis of Shannon and Weaver on information as a value irrespective of the content or meaning implies that information is indissociable from content/meaning. Although Shannon and Weaver explicitly state that information is not the content or meaning, they do not say that information can be separated from content/meaning (Shannon and Weaver 1965, 8-95) . This is an important distinction because it suggests that what is of primary concern in information theory and cybernetics is to develop a means by which a "message" (Wiener's preferred term) or "content" (the term Weaver, Shannon's collaborator, uses) may be quantified so that it may be transmitted through a feedback system (in cybernetics) or along a transmission line (in telecommunications). Thus, it is not exactly accurate to state that Wiener and Shannon want to simply encode meaning, if by this we mean that they want to take meaning as a completely separate unit, which is then translated from a language of quality into a language of quantity (in short, into a language of mathematics). Wiener and Shannon do, however, separately attempt to conceive of a kind of quantifiable signifying system whereby the message or content is always already accounted for by its status as information. In other words, information, while not an object or a thing, is nevertheless the constantly varying, quantitative value of a message or content at a given point within either the cybernetic system or the line of communication. Information, then, as a quantifiable value, must always account for the message or content, even if the message is incomplete, scrambled, or distorted (noise).
Finally, there is a working assumption in cybernetics and information theory that the informational system's goal is always a state of stability and order, and, to borrow a term that is used both in cybernetics and biology, directed toward a state of homeostasis (Hayles 1999, 7-8; Wiener 1996, 8-16 ). What distinguishes information from noise is the stability and internal order of information as it travels across informational channels. Although this foundational assumption of the homeostatic system was modified by later developments in cybernetic theory, it still provides a technical basis for the ways in which information is distributed to this day, and it is here that the links with modern biology make themselves evident. A homeostatic system, be it biological or informatic, continues to maintain its operational mode with a minimum of deviation from that mode-be it a pathology or static, disease or error. What both Wiener and Shannon establish for later conceptualizations of information is an identity between information and stasis, such that the primary effects of information on a system reinforce that system's stable congruity through time. In the systems mapped out by Wiener and Shannon, information does not so much alter the system's mode of operation as it primarily serves as a regulatory process that triggers the maintenance of a normative mode of operativity of a system. The assumption that Shannon and Wiener work from is that meaning is and should be stable with regard to information. However, in order to secure such stability, the transmission of meaning must also be stable: the carriers of information, the transmission of information, must also be stable, constant, and thus transparent. This is not a theoretical question Hayles. The reason information can be a self-identical value, across media, across signifying processes, and across systemic contexts, is precisely because it is conceived, from the beginning, as a value independent of material instantiation. When information is regarded as information, no matter what medium "carries" it, it then becomes a universal, disconnected from the material-technical necessities of the medium, the processes, and the context. It is this universalizing and decontextualizing of information that enables Wiener to conceive of machines and organisms as the same, from the perspective of cybernetic systems operating through feedback loops. I do not want to imply here a critique of Wiener's overall suggestions regarding cybernetic systems; it is the particular way in which information-the central unit of Wiener's and Shannon's theories-is or is not intimately constrained by the contingencies of embodiedness that provides the point of problematization: the theory of information that these foundational texts present to us is one in which information is universalized, decontextualized, and disconnected from the necessities of technological contingency.
We might refer to this process of making a certain definition of "information" foundational to considerations of the body-which I am locating in the work of Wiener and Shannon-as "informatic essentialism." Informatic essentialism is not a repression, denial, or effacement of the body; it proposes that the relationships between the biological body and information technology is such that the body may be approached through the lens of information. In other words, by making informatics a foundational worldview, the body can be considered as "essentially" information. This position-which can be ascribed to the extropian branch of posthumanism with which we began-is not, of course, exclusive to concerns over the bodytechnology relationship; however, it is in this relationship that the tensions inherent in informatic essentialism become clearer.
Informatic essentialism makes the primary move of suggesting that the body-as a material substrate more often than not defined by the biological sciences-can be successfully interpreted and thus reconfigured through an informatic worldview. This also implies that, as information, this body-the body regarded through the lens of informatics-is therefore subject to the same set of technical actions and regulations as is all information. In short, when the body is considered as essentially information, this opens onto the possibility that the body may also be programmed and reprogrammed (and whose predecessor is genetic engineering). Understood as essentially information, and as (re)programmable, the body in informatic essentialism increasingly becomes valued less according to any notion of materiality or substance (as we still see in modern biology) and more according to the value of information itself as the index to all material instantiation-a kind of source code for matter.
The complexity in the posthuman position outlined here is that, on the one hand, it does not necessarily deny materiality or the body, but on the other hand, in equating information with the body it interprets materiality and body in terms of an informational pattern-an asymmetrical, strategic move. With a view of materiality as information, materiality is, again, not denied by the posthumanist position; materiality is now a programmable informational pattern with real effects in a variety of social, political, and scientific contexts. The key to informatic essentialist thinking is not disembodiment, but something more along the lines of file conversions and data translation.
To condense our analysis thus far, we might suggest that the logic of informatic essentialism is as follows: information equals the body, which by extension implies that information equals biology and/or materiality, which leads from the contingency of the biological body to the emancipation of the biological body through the technical potential of informatics. Change the code, and you change the body. Without a consideration of the ways in which the current life sciences are reinterpreting the organism, the body, and life, we risk assuming that, in the epistemological changes brought about by the posthumanist position, the only danger is that of disembodiment. Biotechnology research presents us with a turbulent zone in which the questions that concern posthumanist thinking are brought to a tensioned pitch, in which research seems more science fictional than science fiction itself ("neo-organs" grown on demand), and in which a range of issues have attracted public controversy (governmental regulations over human cloning). Biotech research is unique in that, on the one hand, it employs technologies common to other posthuman fields (principally, computer/information technologies), but on the other hand, its constant "object" of study is the domain of the biological (a domain traditionally set apart from the technological). Instead of being focused on disembodiment and virtuality, biotech research's approach to informatics is toward the capacities of information to materialize bodies (bodies amenable to current paradigms of medicine and health care).
FROM POSTHUMANISM TO BIOTECH

BIOMEDIA IS THE MESSAGE
In contradistinction to the discourses of posthumanism that seek to dematerialize the body (into software Minds, into informational networks), research in biotechnology presents us with a case in which informatic essentialism is utilized to redefine biological materiality. Biotech assumes the classical definition of "information" and "informatic essentialism," but instead of using this definition to direct itself toward the immanence of disembodied pattern (to borrow Hayles's terms), biotech begins to reconfigure the materiality of the body through the lens of technology. In doing so, it is formulating and renegotiating new norms concerning how bodies will be approached by the life sciences and medical practice. That norm takes different forms in different contexts, but in general it has to do with (1) a body that can be effectively approached on the level of information; (2) a body that, as information, can be technically manipulated, controlled, and monitored through information technologies; and, most important, (3) a body that is viewed as fundamentally information (genetic codes), where its being viewed as information does not exclude its being material. This last point is crucial, because it points to the disconcerting ways in which biotech demands that bodies be both informatic and material.
To put it another way, biotech has no body-anxiety; in fact, it is based on a deep investiture and revaluation of the body as a materiality, and one that can be understood and controlled through information. Biomedical science frames this as the recuperated, healthy, homeostatic body-a return to its state of health. But the process is less a circle than a kind of spiral-the body returning to itself is fundamentally different from itself, because it has been significantly retranslated through genetics, gene therapy, stem cell engineering, and so forth. The upward part of this spiral is a self-sufficient, autonomous, immortal body-the dream of the liberal-humanist subject as black box. The downward part of the spiral is the expendable, unstable body-the fears of the loss of autonomy associated with differentiation, otherness, and expendability. Biotech is, above all, a discourse of production and materialization with respect to the scientific body.
As a way of analyzing this further, we can take one particular field as a kind of case study, a field within biotech research known as regenerative medicine.3 Primarily a response to the overwhelming demand for tissue and organs in transplantation, regenerative medicine encompasses research in tissue engineering and stem cells, as well as borrowing techniques from therapeutic cloning, gene therapy, and advanced surgical techniques. Its goal is to be able to regenerate and synthesize biological tissues and even entire organs in the lab. This new horizon of what researchers call "off-the-shelf organs" has prompted many in the medical community to envision a future in which the body's natural capacity to heal itself is radically enhanced through molecular genetics and cellular engineering. Already several products, including a bioengineered skin graft, are being marketed by biotech companies under FDA approval, and laboratory animal experiments involving the synthesis of a tissue-engineered kidney, liver, and even heart are currently underway. Recently, regenerative medicine has made headlines for its discovery of "adult stem cells," cells within the adult body that contain the potential to differentiate into a wide range of cell types, pointing the way for further research into diseases such as Parkinson's and Alzheimer's. 4 On the one hand, the notion of growing organs in the lab evokes the kind of medical horror often seen in science fiction, from Mary Shelley's Frankenstein to the early films of David Cronenberg. On the other hand, regenerative medicine is promising to be among the first medical fields to be able to turn the knowledge (and data) generated by biotech into practical medical applications. Using the techniques of regenerative medicine as our example, we can see three primary moments that characterize this intersection between biotech and infotech.
The first has to do with the "translatability" between flesh and data, or between genetic codes and computer codes. In order for a patient to receive a bioengineered skin graft, blood vessel, or cartilaginous structure, a biopsy or cell sample must first be taken. Using genetics diagnostics tools such as DNA chips and analysis software, DNA samples are translated into computer codes that can be analyzed using bioinformatics software. That is, once the biological body can be effectively interpreted through the lens of informatics, a unique type of encoding can occur between genetic and computer codes. This first step of "encoding" the biological into the informatic is one of the defining moments in the posthuman, allowing the necessity of material instantiation to give way to the mutability of computer code.
The second manner in which biotech integrates itself with infotech is through a technique of programming or "recoding." One of the main breakthroughs that have enabled tissue engineering to regenerate tissues and organs has been the research done into stem cells. Briefly, stem cells are those cells that exist in a state of pluripotency, prior to cellular differentiation in which they may become, for instance, bone, muscle, or blood cells. Researchers can target specific gene clusters that might be activated or deactivated for regeneration to occur. All of this takes place through software applications and database tools that focus on the multiple genetic triggers that take a stem cell down one route of differentiation or another.5 Once the biological body can be effectively "encoded" through informatics, then it follows that the reprogramming of that code will effect analogous changes in the biological domain.
Finally, regenerative medicine mobilizes these techniques of encoding and recoding toward its output-or "decoding"-which is the use of an informatics-based approach to generate or synthesize biological materiality. This is the main goal of tissue engineering-to be able to use the techniques of biotech to actually generate the biological body on demand. Once a patient's cells can be prompted to regenerate into particularized tissue structures, they can then be transplanted back onto the body of the patient, in a strange kind of biological "othering" of the self. From the perspective of medical research, this process is purely "natural," in the sense that it involves the integration of no nonorganic components and in the sense that it utilizes biological processes-in this case, cellular differentiationtoward novel medical ends.
In the research of regenerative medicine, this tripartite process of encoding, recoding, and decoding the body operates through a kind of informatic protocol in which, at each step, information comes to account for the body. It is this process that I would like to refer to as "biomedia." Put briefly, biomedia establishes an equivalency between genetic and computer codes such that the biological body gains a novel technics. The significance of this technical mobility has been described by Donna Haraway: Beyond this, what we find in contemporary biotech is a technically advanced, "thick" investment in the ways in which the body and information are directly related. Biotech is perhaps unique because it is one of the few information sciences that is also a life science; its continued interest is not in the anachronisms of the biological domain, but in the ways in which biology is itself a technology. Indeed, as science historian Robert Bud shows, the very meaning of the term "biotechnology" has, at least since the nineteenth century, indicated the industrial uses of naturally occurring processes (such as fermentation, agriculture, livestock breeding) (Bud 1993 ). Contemporary molecular biotech follows in this tradition. Biotech is not to be confused with bioengineering or prosthetics; that is, biotech is not about interfacing the human with the machine, the organic with the nonorganic. Rather, biotech is about a fundamental reconfiguration of the very processes that constitute the biological domain and their use toward a range of ends, from new techniques in medicine to new modes of agricultural production, and to deterrence programs in biowarfare. As Bud states, biotech has always been about "the uses of life."
The culmination of these elements points to the fact that the condition for the future success of biotechnology will be the integration of information technology into the biological domain while maintaining the ontological separation between human and computer under the ideology of the posthuman. In the biotech future, the body is approached as information, medicine becomes an issue of technical optimization, and "life" becomes a science of informatics.
However, it would be too easy to fall into a position of either technophilia (where a more advanced biotechnology is the answer) or technophobia (where biotech carries the total burden of dehumanization). As one suggestion, we might look to those research endeavors within biotech that are adopting more sophisticated theoretical approaches to the intersections of bioscience and computer science, genetic and computer codes. Hobbyist collaborate with scientists to create projects that deny a reactionary, reductive stance while maintaining the importance of critique.7 These are, certainly, not unproblematic approaches to thinking about the technoscientific body, and there is still much to be considered within research on the cultural valences of technoscience. But such examples may begin to demonstrate the ways in which technology is more than a tool and that elusive materiality called the body is something other than the sum of its parts.
As genome projects are completed, genomic databases are assembled, and biotech becomes increasingly networked into mainstream health care, there needs to be a sustained, transformative intervention into the ways in which flesh is made into data as well as the ways in which data is made flesh.
Notes
